diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 24e8c42..748a86a 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -18,3 +18,7 @@ node_modules/
 
 # ggshield local cache
 .cache_ggshield
+
+# Master key — never commit (default lives in ~/.config, but guard the project root)
+master.key
+*.master.key
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index facacda..8f9dc80 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -18,17 +18,28 @@ claude-code ◄──SSE (detokenized)─── proxy ◄──SSE stream──
 ## How it works
 
 1. **Request interception** — the JSON body of `POST /v1/messages` is scanned by
-   `ggshield`. Every detected secret is replaced with a unique
-   `<<<gg_token_[hex]>>>` placeholder, and the `token → secret` mapping is kept
-   in memory (`src/store.ts`). The redacted body is forwarded upstream.
-2. **Streaming detokenization** — the Anthropic SSE response is piped through a
-   stateful `Transform` (`src/detokenize.ts`) that scans the byte stream for
-   placeholders and substitutes the original secret back. It holds back only the
-   few characters that could still become a token, so a placeholder split across
-   chunk boundaries (`…<<<gg_to` / `ken_abc>>>…`) is reassembled correctly.
+   `ggshield`. Every detected secret is encrypted with **AES-256-GCM** under a
+   persistent master key and replaced with a self-contained
+   `<<<gg_token_[hex]>>>` placeholder, where the hex payload is `IV ++ authTag ++
+   ciphertext`. No server-side mapping is kept — the token carries everything
+   needed to restore it (`src/tokenize.ts`, `src/store.ts`). The redacted body is
+   forwarded upstream.
+2. **Streaming detokenization** — the response is piped through a stateful
+   `Transform` (`src/detokenize.ts`) that finds placeholders, decrypts the hex
+   payload, and substitutes the original secret back. For SSE streams it parses
+   `content_block_delta` events and reassembles the reconstructed text, because
+   the model emits a long placeholder fragmented across many deltas
+   (`…"text":"<<<gg_to"}` / `{"text":"ken_abc>>>"…`) with event framing wedged
+   between the fragments — a raw byte scan can't bridge that. Plain JSON
+   responses, where the token is contiguous, take a simpler direct byte scan.
 
-Secrets live only in memory for the lifetime of the process — restart the proxy
-and the mapping is gone.
+The proxy is **stateless**: tokens are cryptographically self-contained, so they
+resolve correctly even after a restart or when replaying older chat histories.
+The only persistent state is the 256-bit master key, generated on first run and
+stored `0600` at `~/.config/claude-tokenization-proxy/master.key` (override with
+`GG_MASTER_KEY_FILE`). Anyone with that key file can decrypt captured tokens —
+treat it like any other secret, and deleting it makes existing tokens
+unrecoverable.
 
 ## Requirements
 
@@ -160,8 +171,8 @@ that session. To make it stick:
   keys/tokens). A secret literally containing a backslash or double-quote could
   mis-escape inside the response JSON. See the `ponytail:` note in
   `src/detokenize.ts`.
-- The token map is in-memory only; it is not shared across proxy restarts or
-  multiple proxy processes.
+- Tokens are decryptable by anyone holding the master key file. Multiple proxy
+  instances must share the same `master.key` to resolve each other's tokens.
 
 ## License
 
diff --git a/src/detokenize.ts b/src/detokenize.ts
index fefbf7c..0e5c5c5 100644
--- a/src/detokenize.ts
+++ b/src/detokenize.ts
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ import { resolveToken as storeResolve } from "./store.ts";
 
 // Token shape: <<<gg_token_[0-9a-f]+>>>  (hex, because that's what we generate).
 const PREFIX = "<<<gg_token_";
-const SUFFIX = ">>>";
-
 const COMPLETE_RE = /^<<<gg_token_[0-9a-f]+>>>/;
 
+type Resolver = (token: string) => string | undefined;
+
 // Could `s` (which starts with '<') still grow into a token with more input?
 // True for any strict prefix of a well-formed token.
 function isPartialPrefix(s: string): boolean {
@@ -23,33 +23,30 @@ function isPartialPrefix(s: string): boolean {
 }
 
 /**
- * Stateful SSE detokenizer. Scans the raw upstream byte stream for our
- * placeholder tokens and swaps them back to the original secrets on the fly,
- * holding back only the few characters that could still become a token so
- * tokens split across chunk boundaries are reassembled correctly.
+ * Core token scanner. Feed it text fragments; it returns the part that is safe
+ * to emit (with complete tokens swapped for their secrets) and holds back only
+ * the trailing characters that could still grow into a token. `escape` controls
+ * whether a resolved secret is JSON-string-escaped on the way out: true when we
+ * splice it straight into a raw JSON body, false when the caller re-serializes
+ * the surrounding object itself (SSE deltas).
  */
-export class DetokenizeStream extends Transform {
+class TokenScanner {
   private buf = "";
-  private decoder = new StringDecoder("utf8");
-  private resolve: (token: string) => string | undefined;
-
-  constructor(resolve: (token: string) => string | undefined = storeResolve) {
-    super();
+  private resolve: Resolver;
+  private escape: boolean;
+  constructor(resolve: Resolver, escape: boolean) {
     this.resolve = resolve;
+    this.escape = escape;
   }
 
   private emitFor(token: string): string {
     const secret = this.resolve(token);
-    if (secret === undefined) return token; // unknown token: leave it untouched
-    // ponytail: token appears inside a JSON string in the SSE `data:` line, so
-    // re-escape. Assumes secrets are escape-neutral (typical API keys/tokens);
-    // a secret literally containing a backslash or quote would double-escape —
-    // upgrade to context-aware splicing if that ever bites.
-    return JSON.stringify(secret).slice(1, -1);
+    if (secret === undefined) return token; // unknown/corrupt token: leave untouched
+    return this.escape ? JSON.stringify(secret).slice(1, -1) : secret;
   }
 
-  override _transform(chunk: Buffer, _enc: BufferEncoding, cb: TransformCallback): void {
-    this.buf += this.decoder.write(chunk);
+  push(text: string): string {
+    this.buf += text;
     let out = "";
     while (this.buf.length > 0) {
       const lt = this.buf.indexOf("<");
@@ -67,18 +64,120 @@ export class DetokenizeStream extends Transform {
         this.buf = this.buf.slice(complete[0].length);
         continue;
       }
-      if (isPartialPrefix(this.buf)) break; // might finish next chunk; hold it
-      // This '<' can't begin a token. Emit it and keep scanning past it.
-      out += "<";
+      if (isPartialPrefix(this.buf)) break; // might finish next fragment; hold it
+      out += "<"; // this '<' can't begin a token
       this.buf = this.buf.slice(1);
     }
-    cb(null, out);
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  // Emit whatever is held back verbatim. Anything still buffered here is, by
+  // construction, an incomplete token, so it can only be passed through as-is.
+  flush(): string {
+    const out = this.buf;
+    this.buf = "";
+    return out;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Stateful detokenizer for the upstream response body. Two modes:
+ *
+ *  - Raw (plain JSON responses): scan the byte stream directly. Tokens are
+ *    contiguous in a single body, so the scanner reassembles them across TCP
+ *    chunk boundaries and re-escapes the spliced-in secret.
+ *
+ *  - SSE (streaming responses): the model emits a placeholder fragmented across
+ *    many `content_block_delta` events, with JSON/SSE framing wedged between the
+ *    token's characters. Scanning raw bytes can't bridge that, so we parse each
+ *    event, run the *reconstructed* delta text through the scanner (which holds
+ *    a partial token across deltas), and re-serialize. A token can't span a
+ *    content block, so we flush any held tail at `content_block_stop`.
+ */
+export class DetokenizeStream extends Transform {
+  private decoder = new StringDecoder("utf8");
+  private sse: boolean;
+  private scanner: TokenScanner;
+  private sseBuf = ""; // bytes not yet forming a complete `\n\n`-terminated event
+  private currentIndex = 0; // index of the open content block (for flush deltas)
+
+  constructor(opts: { sse?: boolean; resolve?: Resolver } = {}) {
+    super();
+    this.sse = opts.sse ?? false;
+    // Raw mode splices into a JSON body (escape); SSE mode re-stringifies the
+    // delta object itself, so the secret must stay raw.
+    this.scanner = new TokenScanner(opts.resolve ?? storeResolve, !this.sse);
+  }
+
+  override _transform(chunk: Buffer, _enc: BufferEncoding, cb: TransformCallback): void {
+    const text = this.decoder.write(chunk);
+    cb(null, this.sse ? this.feedSSE(text) : this.scanner.push(text));
   }
 
   override _flush(cb: TransformCallback): void {
-    const out = this.buf + this.decoder.end();
-    this.buf = "";
-    cb(null, out);
+    const tail = this.decoder.end();
+    if (this.sse) {
+      let out = this.feedSSE(tail);
+      out += this.flushPending(); // emit any held token tail as a final delta
+      out += this.sseBuf; // leftover incomplete event, if any
+      this.sseBuf = "";
+      cb(null, out);
+    } else {
+      cb(null, this.scanner.push(tail) + this.scanner.flush());
+    }
+  }
+
+  private feedSSE(text: string): string {
+    this.sseBuf += text;
+    let out = "";
+    let idx: number;
+    while ((idx = this.sseBuf.indexOf("\n\n")) !== -1) {
+      const ev = this.sseBuf.slice(0, idx);
+      this.sseBuf = this.sseBuf.slice(idx + 2);
+      out += this.handleEvent(ev) + "\n\n";
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  private handleEvent(ev: string): string {
+    const lines = ev.split("\n");
+    const di = lines.findIndex((l) => l.startsWith("data:"));
+    if (di === -1) return ev; // no data line: passthrough
+    let obj: Record<string, unknown>;
+    try {
+      obj = JSON.parse(lines[di].slice(lines[di].indexOf(":") + 1).trim());
+    } catch {
+      return ev; // not JSON (e.g. `data: [DONE]`): passthrough untouched
+    }
+
+    const delta = obj.delta as { type?: string; text?: string } | undefined;
+    if (obj.type === "content_block_delta" && delta?.type === "text_delta" && typeof delta.text === "string") {
+      if (typeof obj.index === "number") this.currentIndex = obj.index;
+      delta.text = this.scanner.push(delta.text); // may hold a partial token across deltas
+      lines[di] = "data: " + JSON.stringify(obj);
+      return lines.join("\n");
+    }
+
+    // A token never spans a content block, so flush any held tail before the
+    // block closes. Pings / message_* / content_block_start must NOT flush —
+    // they can legitimately arrive mid-token.
+    if (obj.type === "content_block_stop") {
+      return this.flushPending() + ev;
+    }
+    return ev;
+  }
+
+  // Emit the scanner's held-back tail (an incomplete token) as its own
+  // synthesized text_delta on the current block, so it stays valid SSE.
+  private flushPending(): string {
+    const tail = this.scanner.flush();
+    if (!tail) return "";
+    const evt = {
+      type: "content_block_delta",
+      index: this.currentIndex,
+      delta: { type: "text_delta", text: tail },
+    };
+    return "event: content_block_delta\ndata: " + JSON.stringify(evt) + "\n\n";
   }
 }
 
@@ -93,9 +192,9 @@ function runSelfTest(): void {
   ]);
   const resolve = (t: string) => map.get(t);
 
-  // Feed input split into arbitrary chunks, collect output.
-  const run = (chunks: string[]): string => {
-    const s = new DetokenizeStream(resolve);
+  // ---- raw mode (plain JSON responses) ----------------------------------
+  const runRaw = (chunks: string[]): string => {
+    const s = new DetokenizeStream({ resolve });
     let out = "";
     s.on("data", (d) => (out += d.toString()));
     for (const c of chunks) s.write(Buffer.from(c, "utf8"));
@@ -103,36 +202,82 @@ function runSelfTest(): void {
     return out;
   };
 
-  // 1. Token split across a chunk boundary (the critical case).
   assert(
-    run(["password is <<<gg_to", "ken_abc123>>> done"]) ===
-      "password is SUPER-SECRET-KEY done",
-    "split token reassembled",
+    runRaw(["password is <<<gg_to", "ken_abc123>>> done"]) === "password is SUPER-SECRET-KEY done",
+    "raw: split token reassembled",
+  );
+  assert(runRaw("x <<<gg_token_dead>>> y".split("")) === "x hunter2 y", "raw: char-by-char token");
+  assert(runRaw(["a < b <<< c <<<not"]) === "a < b <<< c <<<not", "raw: non-token < flushed");
+  assert(runRaw(["see <<<gg_token_ffff>>>!"]) === "see <<<gg_token_ffff>>>!", "raw: unknown token kept");
+  assert(
+    runRaw(["<<<gg_token_abc123>>><<<gg_token_dead>>>"]) === "SUPER-SECRET-KEYhunter2",
+    "raw: adjacent tokens",
+  );
+  assert(runRaw(["tail <<<gg_token_ab"]) === "tail <<<gg_token_ab", "raw: incomplete token flushed on end");
+  assert(runRaw(["<<<<gg_token_dead>>>"]) === "<hunter2", "raw: leading extra angle bracket");
+
+  // ---- SSE mode (streaming responses) -----------------------------------
+  const delta = (text: string, index = 0) =>
+    `event: content_block_delta\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ type: "content_block_delta", index, delta: { type: "text_delta", text } })}\n\n`;
+  const stop = (index = 0) =>
+    `event: content_block_stop\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ type: "content_block_stop", index })}\n\n`;
+  const ping = () => `event: ping\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ type: "ping" })}\n\n`;
+
+  const runSSE = (chunks: string[]): string => {
+    const s = new DetokenizeStream({ sse: true, resolve });
+    let out = "";
+    s.on("data", (d) => (out += d.toString()));
+    for (const c of chunks) s.write(Buffer.from(c, "utf8"));
+    s.end();
+    return out;
+  };
+  // Concatenate the text the client would reconstruct from the output deltas.
+  const clientText = (sse: string): string => {
+    let text = "";
+    for (const block of sse.split("\n\n")) {
+      const line = block.split("\n").find((l) => l.startsWith("data:"));
+      if (!line) continue;
+      try {
+        const o = JSON.parse(line.slice(line.indexOf(":") + 1).trim());
+        if (o?.delta?.type === "text_delta") text += o.delta.text;
+      } catch {
+        /* ignore non-JSON */
+      }
+    }
+    return text;
+  };
+
+  // 1. The critical case: a token fragmented across many text deltas (8 chars
+  //    each), as the model actually streams a long placeholder.
+  const tok = "<<<gg_token_abc123>>>";
+  const frag = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < tok.length; i += 4) frag.push(delta(tok.slice(i, i + 4)));
+  assert(
+    clientText(runSSE(["before "].map((t) => delta(t)).concat(frag, [delta(" after"), stop()])).valueOf()) ===
+      "before SUPER-SECRET-KEY after",
+    "sse: token fragmented across deltas reassembled",
   );
 
-  // 2. Token split one char at a time.
+  // 2. A ping arriving mid-token must NOT break reassembly.
   assert(
-    run("x <<<gg_token_dead>>> y".split("")) === "x hunter2 y",
-    "char-by-char token",
+    clientText(runSSE([delta("k="), delta("<<<gg_to"), ping(), delta("ken_dead>>>"), stop()])) === "k=hunter2",
+    "sse: ping mid-token tolerated",
   );
 
-  // 3. Plain text with stray '<' and '<<<' that is NOT a token flushes promptly.
-  assert(run(["a < b <<< c <<<not"]) === "a < b <<< c <<<not", "non-token < flushed");
-
-  // 4. Unknown token passes through unchanged.
-  assert(run(["see <<<gg_token_ffff>>>!"]) === "see <<<gg_token_ffff>>>!", "unknown token kept");
-
-  // 5. Two tokens back to back.
+  // 3. Incomplete token at content_block_stop is flushed verbatim.
   assert(
-    run(["<<<gg_token_abc123>>><<<gg_token_dead>>>"]) === "SUPER-SECRET-KEYhunter2",
-    "adjacent tokens",
+    clientText(runSSE([delta("oops <<<gg_token_ab"), stop()])) === "oops <<<gg_token_ab",
+    "sse: incomplete token flushed at block stop",
   );
 
-  // 6. Incomplete token at end of stream flushed verbatim.
-  assert(run(["tail <<<gg_token_ab"]) === "tail <<<gg_token_ab", "incomplete token flushed on end");
+  // 4. Whole token in a single delta still works.
+  assert(
+    clientText(runSSE([delta("hi <<<gg_token_dead>>>!"), stop()])) === "hi hunter2!",
+    "sse: contiguous token in one delta",
+  );
 
-  // 7. Overlapping '<' runs.
-  assert(run(["<<<<gg_token_dead>>>"]) === "<hunter2", "leading extra angle bracket");
+  // 5. Non-text events pass through untouched (structure preserved).
+  assert(runSSE([ping()]) === ping(), "sse: ping passthrough verbatim");
 
   console.log("detokenize self-test: all assertions passed");
 }
diff --git a/src/index.ts b/src/index.ts
index f8fe4dc..340d034 100644
--- a/src/index.ts
+++ b/src/index.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ import http from "node:http";
 import https from "node:https";
 import { tokenizeBody } from "./tokenize.ts";
 import { DetokenizeStream } from "./detokenize.ts";
+import { initMasterKey } from "./store.ts";
+
+// Load (or generate) the master key once, before any request can encrypt or
+// decrypt a token. Fail fast if the key file is unreadable/corrupt.
+initMasterKey();
 
 const PORT = Number(process.env.PORT) || 8080;
 const UPSTREAM_HOST = process.env.ANTHROPIC_UPSTREAM_HOST || "api.anthropic.com";
@@ -48,8 +53,11 @@ const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
       (upRes) => {
         res.writeHead(upRes.statusCode ?? 502, pick(upRes.headers, STRIP_RES));
         if (isTarget) {
-          // Detokenize the response body (SSE or JSON) on the way back.
-          upRes.pipe(new DetokenizeStream()).pipe(res);
+          // Detokenize the response on the way back. SSE streams fragment a
+          // placeholder across many deltas, so the detokenizer needs to parse
+          // events; plain JSON bodies carry the token contiguously.
+          const sse = String(upRes.headers["content-type"] ?? "").includes("text/event-stream");
+          upRes.pipe(new DetokenizeStream({ sse })).pipe(res);
         } else {
           upRes.pipe(res);
         }
diff --git a/src/store.ts b/src/store.ts
index cb56cb2..5b8fc4a 100644
--- a/src/store.ts
+++ b/src/store.ts
@@ -1,12 +1,73 @@
 // Copyright (C) 2026 Rootiest
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 
-// In-memory token <-> secret map. ponytail: a Map is enough; secrets live only
-// for the lifetime of the proxy process. Swap for SQLite only if you need
-// persistence across restarts (you almost certainly don't — secrets shouldn't
-// outlive the session).
-export const secrets = new Map<string, string>();
+import { createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
 
-export function resolveToken(token: string): string | undefined {
-  return secrets.get(token);
+// Cryptographic self-contained tokens: the placeholder carries its own
+// ciphertext, so the proxy is stateless. The only persistent state is the
+// master key, kept in a 0600 file so tokens survive restarts.
+const KEY_PATH =
+  process.env.GG_MASTER_KEY_FILE ||
+  join(homedir(), ".config", "claude-tokenization-proxy", "master.key");
+
+// AES-256-GCM layout inside the hex blob: 12-byte IV, 16-byte auth tag, then
+// the ciphertext. detokenize slices on these fixed boundaries.
+export const IV_BYTES = 12;
+export const TAG_BYTES = 16;
+const IV_HEX = IV_BYTES * 2;
+const TAG_HEX = TAG_BYTES * 2;
+
+let masterKey: Buffer | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * Load the 256-bit master key from disk, generating and persisting one (0600)
+ * on first run. Call once at startup before serving traffic. Idempotent.
+ */
+export function initMasterKey(): Buffer {
+  if (masterKey) return masterKey;
+  try {
+    const key = readFileSync(KEY_PATH);
+    if (key.length !== 32) {
+      throw new Error(`master key at ${KEY_PATH} is ${key.length} bytes, expected 32`);
+    }
+    masterKey = key;
+  } catch (err) {
+    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ENOENT") throw err;
+    const key = randomBytes(32);
+    mkdirSync(dirname(KEY_PATH), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    writeFileSync(KEY_PATH, key, { mode: 0o600 });
+    console.warn(`[proxy] generated new master key at ${KEY_PATH}`);
+    masterKey = key;
+  }
+  return masterKey;
+}
+
+export function getMasterKey(): Buffer {
+  if (!masterKey) throw new Error("master key not initialized — call initMasterKey() first");
+  return masterKey;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decrypt a full placeholder token back to its secret. Returns undefined for
+ * anything that isn't one of our tokens or that fails authentication, so
+ * unknown/corrupt placeholders pass through the stream untouched.
+ */
+export function resolveToken(token: string): string | undefined {
+  const m = /^<<<gg_token_([0-9a-f]+)>>>$/.exec(token);
+  if (!m) return undefined;
+  const blob = m[1];
+  if (blob.length <= IV_HEX + TAG_HEX) return undefined;
+  try {
+    const iv = Buffer.from(blob.slice(0, IV_HEX), "hex");
+    const tag = Buffer.from(blob.slice(IV_HEX, IV_HEX + TAG_HEX), "hex");
+    const ciphertext = Buffer.from(blob.slice(IV_HEX + TAG_HEX), "hex");
+    const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", getMasterKey(), iv);
+    decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]).toString("utf8");
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
 }
diff --git a/src/tokenize.ts b/src/tokenize.ts
index be9cee9..957b34f 100644
--- a/src/tokenize.ts
+++ b/src/tokenize.ts
@@ -2,16 +2,24 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 
 import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
-import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { createCipheriv, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { mkdtemp, writeFile, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
-import { secrets } from "./store.ts";
+import { getMasterKey, IV_BYTES } from "./store.ts";
 
 let ggshieldWarned = false;
 
-function newToken(): string {
-  return `<<<gg_token_${randomBytes(8).toString("hex")}>>>`;
+// Encrypt a secret into a self-contained placeholder. The payload is a single
+// hex blob (IV ++ auth tag ++ ciphertext) so it matches the stream parser's
+// [0-9a-f]+ token boundary and needs no server-side state to resolve later.
+function encryptToken(secret: string): string {
+  const iv = randomBytes(IV_BYTES);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", getMasterKey(), iv);
+  const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(secret, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  const blob = `${iv.toString("hex")}${tag.toString("hex")}${ciphertext.toString("hex")}`;
+  return `<<<gg_token_${blob}>>>`;
 }
 
 // Run ggshield over `text` and return the list of plaintext secret strings it
@@ -64,9 +72,9 @@ async function scanSecrets(text: string): Promise<string[]> {
 }
 
 /**
- * Scan a raw request body for secrets, replace each with a placeholder token,
- * record the token->secret mapping, and return the redacted body. Longest
- * secrets first so a secret that contains another is replaced whole.
+ * Scan a raw request body for secrets and replace each with an encrypted
+ * self-contained placeholder. Longest secrets first so a secret that contains
+ * another is replaced whole. Stateless: the token carries its own ciphertext.
  */
 export async function tokenizeBody(body: string): Promise<string> {
   const found = await scanSecrets(body);
@@ -75,9 +83,7 @@ export async function tokenizeBody(body: string): Promise<string> {
   let redacted = body;
   for (const secret of found.sort((a, b) => b.length - a.length)) {
     if (!redacted.includes(secret)) continue;
-    const token = newToken();
-    secrets.set(token, secret);
-    redacted = redacted.split(secret).join(token);
+    redacted = redacted.split(secret).join(encryptToken(secret));
   }
   return redacted;
 }