# claude-tokenization-proxy A local Data Loss Prevention (DLP) proxy that sits between `claude-code` and the Anthropic API. It scans outgoing requests for secrets with [GitGuardian's `ggshield`](https://github.com/GitGuardian/ggshield), swaps each secret for an opaque placeholder token before it leaves your machine, then restores the real secret in the streamed response on the fly — so Claude never sees your secrets but tooling that echoes a placeholder still gets the real value back. ``` claude-code ──POST /v1/messages──► proxy ──redacted──► api.anthropic.com │ (ggshield scan, secret → <<>>) claude-code ◄──SSE (detokenized)─── proxy ◄──SSE stream──┘ (<<>> → real secret, streaming) ``` ## How it works 1. **Request interception** — the JSON body of `POST /v1/messages` is scanned by `ggshield`. Every detected secret is replaced with a unique `<<>>` placeholder, and the `token → secret` mapping is kept in memory (`src/store.ts`). The redacted body is forwarded upstream. 2. **Streaming detokenization** — the Anthropic SSE response is piped through a stateful `Transform` (`src/detokenize.ts`) that scans the byte stream for placeholders and substitutes the original secret back. It holds back only the few characters that could still become a token, so a placeholder split across chunk boundaries (`…<<>>…`) is reassembled correctly. Secrets live only in memory for the lifetime of the process — restart the proxy and the mapping is gone. ## Requirements - **Node.js ≥ 23.6** (the proxy runs TypeScript directly via Node's built-in type stripping — no build step, no `ts-node`/`tsx`). On Node 22.6–23.5 run with `node --experimental-strip-types src/index.ts`. - **`ggshield`** on your `PATH` and authenticated (`ggshield auth login`). If `ggshield` is missing or errors, the proxy logs a warning and forwards traffic **unredacted** (fail-open) — it never blocks your requests. ## Setup ```bash npm install # dev-only deps (TypeScript types); not needed to run npm start # starts the proxy on http://127.0.0.1:8080 ``` Point `claude-code` at the proxy: ```bash export ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8080 claude ``` For the [fish shell](https://fishshell.com/): ```fish set -gx ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL http://localhost:8080 claude ``` That's the only change `claude-code` needs — it keeps using your normal `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` / `x-api-key`, which the proxy forwards untouched. ## Configuration | Env var | Default | Purpose | | ----------------------- | ------------------ | -------------------------------- | | `PORT` | `8080` | Port the proxy listens on | | `ANTHROPIC_UPSTREAM_HOST` | `api.anthropic.com` | Upstream API host to forward to | ## Tell Claude to leave the tokens alone So the model preserves placeholders verbatim (e.g. when writing them to files), copy [`templates/CLAUDE.md`](templates/CLAUDE.md) into the `CLAUDE.md` of any project you run `claude-code` in: ```markdown # Security Constraints Do not modify, remove, or evaluate strings formatted as `<<>>`. Treat them as opaque identifiers and preserve them exactly as they appear when writing or reading files. ``` ## Scripts | Command | What it does | | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | | `npm start` | Run the proxy | | `npm run dev` | Run with `--watch` (restarts on file changes) | | `npm test` | Run the detokenizer state-machine self-check | | `npm run typecheck` | Type-check the source with `tsc --noEmit` | ## Limitations - Detection is only as good as `ggshield`. It catches known secret patterns and generic high-entropy strings, not arbitrary sensitive prose. - Re-inserted secrets are assumed to be escape-neutral (typical API keys/tokens). A secret literally containing a backslash or double-quote could mis-escape inside the response JSON. See the `ponytail:` note in `src/detokenize.ts`. - The token map is in-memory only; it is not shared across proxy restarts or multiple proxy processes. ## License Copyright (C) 2026 Rootiest. Licensed under the [GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 or later](LICENSE).